The fateful alliance between classical liberals and conservatives was aided in part by their mutual attraction to arguments beginning in the Scottish Enlightenment and continuing through Edmund Burke, and later in economics, that reason alone could not plan a just society. As more egalitarian and managerially oriented liberals gravitated towards a more activist government as a solution to social ills, classical liberals turned towards the conservative respect for traditional practices, a position reinforced by their knowledge of the market as a spontaneous order in Hayek’s terminology, and the intricate customs that empowered civil society as an order of the same kind. External political intervention was seen as doomed to failure from overweening hubris, and all too likely to eventuate in despotism.
Understandable as this move was, I think it was an error, and that much of our current political crisis results from it.
Adam Smith’s first work on how order arises spontaneously in society was his study of the evolution of language, not the market. Even earlier Hume had emphasized its role in custom, as had Adam Ferguson. Economics was simply one (very important) case of a larger phenomena first identified in the Scottish Enlightenment. A comment Smith made about businessmen and the market was glossed over by most subsequent classical liberals: that businessmen rarely get together except to game the market at the consumer’s expense. The reply, of course, is that competitiveness in the market ultimately destroys such efforts. But this reply underestimates the problem Smith identified.
There is a central tension in all social spontaneous orders: that between the processes that generate the order and the immediate interests of those who are successful within it. In simple terms, it is a conflict between spontaneous order and instrumental organization. Any business that succeeds within the market also runs the risk of eventually being put out of business through the arrival of new competitors or changed conditions.
Let us grant for the moment that the unrestricted market prevents the development of serious distortions by businesses. (I no longer believe this, but whether or not this is true is not vital to the argument.) Successful businesses will then seek extra market means for stabilizing their environment and ensuring their longevity. Businesses have a long history of seeking to use government to provide them a safer and more profitable environment. This is as true of downtown merchants seeking ordinances and zoning to deter competition as it is of large corporations seeking enforced national standardization and privileges such as no-bid contracts. What is true for businesses in the market is equally true for all organizations in any social emergent order. Different orders face this problem to different degrees largely from the ease or difficulty their organizations face in stabilizing their environment.
Here we get to the tension, I think the fatal tension, between the broad Lockean liberal outlook and the Burkean conservative outlook.
Hayek’s concept of spontaneous order in its pure form required that all participants be subject to the same rules, hold equal legal status, and be equally free in a formal sense to enter into cooperative arrangements with others subject to those rules. This ideal is never perfectly realized, but in the modern spontaneous orders of the market, science, and democracy it comes remarkably close.
Pre-liberal evolutionary processes, like custom, saw similar processes operating within a framework where marked differences in status were constitutive parts of the framework that needed to adapt. Custom always reflected evolutionary processes, but it often included power relations between groups who had been able to use government to insulate themselves from much change, and powerless groups who had not. Think of the privileged positions favored state churches held in different European countries or the very different statuses of men and women as examples. Over a thousand years of enforced monotheism powerfully influenced ‘spontaneous’ customary developments. So did an even longer establishment of unequal relations between the genders.
Conservatives admired the specific qualities of a given custom regime, to cpin a term. Liberals admired the ways in which that regime adjusted to and incorporated changes through a constant process of adjustment. Conservatives used this logic to defend customs they admired from attempts to change them deliberately, but they admired the customs and not the process of change and adjustment. And one of the things they admired was a certain kind of hierarchical arrangement between people that they believed to be just.
While both the custom that conservatives such as Burke admired, and the market that Smith admired, were emergent orders, only the market reflected anything close to equal procedural rules for all. Here was the core inner tension between the classical liberal support for legal equality of status and the conservative support for the customary status quo. Liberlas, including classical liberals, admired the process of peaceful evolution whereas conservatives, like businessmen in the market, liked the particular status quo that had come to dominate at a particular point in time.
This tension did not come to a serious head until the conservative/classical liberal alliance incorporated the basically anti-liberal culture of the American South. IAs a result this alliance has now reached a point of political and philosophical incoherence.
If we look at many of the changes that egalitarian liberals have sought to accomplish in our society, such as ending “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” to allowing for gay marriage, as well as their battle against attempts to get government to promote a particular religious outlook, they are on the side of America’s founding principles. The “culture warriors” and the like are on the side of strengthening traditional politically enforced hierarchies of status.
This importance of this incoherence is pretty clearly caught in a crucial shift in political terminology within this political alliance. There was a time when the terminology focused on the necessity for “limited government.” Now the terminology is for “small government.” A limited government is limited in its power vis-a-vis citizens. A small government does not seek to influence many matters, supposedly, but can be quite unlimited within the sphere in which it acts. This is why the conservative part of the alliance made not a word of protest when the Bush administration attacked habeus corpus as it had traditionally been used, used “signing statements,” and adopted a doctrine of being able to attack anyone who might in the future become a threat. Nor did very many classical liberals object as this sea change in political terminology took place. Under Obama health care has been attacked in the name of “small government” but his continuing many Bush initiatives in executive power has gone largely unmentioned.
With that plus the incorporation of the culture warriors, I fear classical liberalism has committed political seppeku. I think where the classical liberal tradition can find new life and insight is in a more serious understanding of emergent social phenomena in all their complexity.
David
September 28, 2010
I think the overly narrow domain of “economic freedom” may have played a role in what I see as the dangerous alliance between (some) classical liberals and conservatives. The reason I say this is that a distinction between “economic” and “non-economic” freedoms is totally arbitrary and rests on a misunderstanding of economic theory. If economic freedom means a protected individual sphere (protected property rights in the most abstract sense of the term), then freedom of speech, freedom of worship, marital arrangements, drug use, euthanasia, immigration etc. are no less “economic freedoms” than low tax rates. But the focus of most classical liberals have been on exactly those arbitrarily delimited freedoms where they can find common ground with market-oriented conservatives. They have thus skewed their priorities in favor of the most easily observable property rights concerns (tax rates etc.) at the expense of freedoms that can be construed in equally “economic” terms, but which are more easily manipulated into being perceived as “non-economic” moral issues by conservatives who think an elite should decide on a specific religious, traditional, and/or nationalist value system that is to be made compulsory.
Admittedly, there are some libertarians who understand this, but they tend to be anarchists, which is a pity for those of us who value limited government rather over an absence of government.
Gus diZerega
September 30, 2010
David –
I will disagree with your analysis of freedom, but not with the broader point that this alliance has proven a disaster.
Economic freedom means freedom to enter into economic exchanges, and in practice while I suppose we could say they were once part of something we can call ”exchanges” as such, such as saying “good day,” receiving a nod in return, and subsumed completely within civil society, economic exchanges developed into exchanges mediated by money and coordinated by the price system.
Today most economic exchanges are done primarily for the money they hopefully will ultimately save or make. Exchanges where the price system is unimportant, such as my desire t marry someone and her desire to marry me, when done for love, are not economic in any reasonable sense of the term. Prostitution is. A system which analyses human action so as not to be able to distinguish between love and prostitution is not capable of adequately analyzing HUMAN action.
That my distinction is not arbitrary is evidenced by the fact that the spontaneous order of the market is different from the spontaneous order of science. Their feedback reflects different values, all of which are voluntarily arrived at. Both the market and science grew out of civil society, and as they specialized their feedback signals specialized as well, until they can be analyzed on their own terms for many purposes. When scientific discoveries become private property the pace of scientific research slows and is thwarted by the private interests of the property owner rather than the judgment of the scientific community.
What makes economics a science is that the exchanges develop into a largely impersonal coordination system where individual motives do not matter much. The laws of economics work as well with the production of Bibles as they do with the production of porn.
Finally, as economic exchanges become more complex determining property rights becomes more complicated. In addition, as the collective impact of people using their property rights changes the over all environment, rights once regarded as private sometimes need to be eliminated – and the market cannot do so on its own. For example, air pollution arises from wood stoves and in certain areas, such as Missoula, Montana, past a certain number the resulting pollution becomes toxic. Rights at some point need to be redefined. Law does so, and for losers to accept the law they must believe it was done by defensible procedures. No reasonable person believes that he who pays the most money should make the law. Some other means is necessary for losers reasonably to feel they were treated fairly.
David
October 1, 2010
Gus: I think we’re using the same term to mean different things. I’m not saying that property rights necessarily involve profit-seeking market arrangement. If I have a right to express my thoughts in writing, it simply means that I have a protected sphere where I have effective control over what I’m typing right now. No other person or authority has the right to intervene provided that I have acquired the material means (for example pen and paper). Whether we regulate the diffusion of ideas via a copyright system or a “free diffusion + citations” system will depend on the perceived “efficiency” of the system as a whole. But my right to freedom of expression remains an economic property right as long as the term “property right” refers to effective control over resources (i.e. my effective control over the articulation of my ideas). Likewise, people have property rights over marriage arrangements when two (or more!) people can decide to get married spontaneously, without reference to the norms of the political majority. This would typically not be a profit-seeking combination of property rights (a marriage is like a firm in that it entails combined property rights, but is unlike a firm in that it tends not to be profit-seeking). That certain attributes such as love or trust cannot be bought at a market price does not mean that property rights are irrelevant in other spontaneous orders than the market. What I’m saying is hat “economic” rights are not confined to the market, the concept simply refers to effective control over resources.
Gus diZerega
October 3, 2010
David- I think the term “property” when applied so broadly leads to a subtle change in what it is to be a human being from what most of us think is the case. Property, especially when considered as an economic category, implies that it is alienable. Robert Nozick argued for the right of voluntary slavery, and I have heard the defended by more than one libertarian, although others reject the idea.
Regardless of where we stand on that issue, I think it uncovers problems with using property as a foundational concept. One big problem beyond its moral obtuseness is that I cannot sell or otherwise alienate my responsibility for my actions. If my dog bites you I am liable. If my slave bites you the slave is liable. This so far as I know has always been the law in slave owning societies. Therefore what on earth does it mean to sell myself?
If I cannot sell myself into slavery what on earth does it mean to say I “own” my self? If it is meaningless, as I contend, ownership is derivative from qualities of the self, and so property is derivative.
In my view a property right is the right to enter or not enter into a certain kind of relationship. It’s legitimacy is based on whether the relationship is deemed appropriate. Robinson Crusoe needed no property rights until Friday came along.
A property right also cannot be fundamental because relationships are contextual, and as contexts change appropriate relationships can also change. My favorite example is air pollution, where something I long had a right to do – heat with a wood stove for warmth – can, when enough others do it, become hazardous to people’s health. Then the rights need to be redefined based on some concept of appropriate relationship. In Missoula, MT, no one can build a home and heat with old style wood stoves any more, though they once had a right to do so.
For another example, once people could mistreat their animals. Today that is less and less the case. The animals remain property, but the range of relationships with which I can enter into with them has shrunk. You say as much when you describe a property right as a resource. A resource is valuable for what it can be USED for. Usually, maybe always, a resource is valuable to the extent it can be turned into other things. When and to the degree something is not a thing, it is not simply a resource, and treating it as property does not do it justice,
A marriage, when done for love, is not a resource. A good marriage brings many tangible advantages that could also be bought and sold, or traded, but the marriage itself is not of that character. Think of friendship. Friends are useful, but if I relate with you only because you are useful, I am not your friend. If I marry someone because of the personal advantages I expect to gain from the relationship, I do not marry for love. And people marry for love all the time.